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CONTRACTS
by
The Board of Editors*

T

HE MANY contract cases decided by Texas courts during the survey

period reveal little change in Texas law. However, several cases discussed in this Article contain novel issues which are of interest to students
and practitioners of law. Also of interest is a statute1 enacted by the 61st
Legislature of Texas dealing with the problem of unsolicited goods. This
statute, which became effective on September 1, 1969, should raise interesting questions in the future.
I.

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE: UNSOLICITED

GOODS

Under general principles of contract law, the delivery of unsolicited
goods to a person may create an implied contract to pay.! The contract
may be either implied in fact, as from acts of the recipient amounting to
acceptance, or implied in law, as from acceptance of benefits from the
goods, even without intention to pay.' Although liability for payment may
be avoided by returning the goods or the benefits from them,4 in practice
such goods often are accepted and paid for. The recipient may pay either
to avoid inconvenience or because he is ignorant of his legal status. Article
29c-1, s recently enacted by the Texas Legislature, should have a significant
effect on this problem. The statute provides that "unless otherwise agreed"
the recipient of unsolicited goods may refuse to accept delivery without
an obligation to return the goods to the sender. Although the Act provides that goods received due to a bona fide mistake must be returned, the
burden of proving such a mistake is upon the sender. Finally, the Act
stipulates that unsolicited goods "addressed to or intended for the recipient" are deemed to be a gift.
Several questions are raised by the statute. First, there is a discrepancy
between the caption of the statute and the language of the text. The caption refers to "anyone receiving anything unordered in the mail." No
such limitation on the manner of delivery is found in the body of the
statute, which simply provides for "unsolicited goods delivered . . . ad-

dressed to or intended for the recipient." Although this discrepancy should
not nullify the statute,' it remains to be determined whether the caption
may have the effect of narrowing its application. As a general rule a court
* The Board of Editors gratefully acknowledges the assistance of S. David Blinn and Donald L.
Sweatt in the preparation of this Article.
'Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 700, at 2044.
"Ferrous Prods. Co. v. Gulf States Trading Co., 323 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1959); 1 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 91D (3d ed. 1957).
8RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

S

72 (1932).

4 Id.
5 Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 700, at 2044.
6TEx. CONST. art. III, 5 35; Independent School Dist. v. Central Educ. Agency, 247 S.W.2d
597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952).
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may refer to the caption or title in construing a statute.' Although it
has been held that where the caption and body of a statute conflict, the
caption must yield,' there are cases to the contrary.9 Accordingly, whether
this statute applies only to unsolicited goods received in the mail, or to all
modes of delivery, will not be known until the question is presented to the
courts.
Another aspect of the statute which raises questions is the introductory
phrase, "unless otherwise agreed." In the situation of continued subscriptions to papers, magazines, books or records, the obligations of the recipient are often unclear since they are controlled for the most part by
oral or ambiguously worded written agreements. Despite the salutary effect
which the statute should have in many situations, it may provide, by the
introductory phrase, an exemption for institutions such as book and record
clubs which provide in the initial agreement for renewals, further orders,
and the manner of terminating the agreement.
Unfortunately, the statute will remedy only a part of the problem at
which it is aimed. Although it may have the effect of clearly delineating
the rights of parties to whom unsolicited goods are delivered, it may fail
to reduce the incidence of acceptance and payment because of ignorance
on the part of the recipient, or his acquiescence to avoid inconvenience.
Perhaps the statute will serve at best as a deterrent to persons delivering
unsolicited goods solely with the expectation of payment for them.
II.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

During the period surveyed, three cases of significance were decided
which involved the Statute of Frauds." In the first of these cases, Cooper
Petroleum Co. v. LaGloriaOil & Gas Co.," the Texas supreme court found
that an oral contract which failed to come within the "main purpose"
exception" to the Statute of Frauds may be enforceable. Cooper involved
transactions between three corporations, LaGloria Oil and Gas Company
(LaGloria Oil), International Marketing Corporation (IMI), and Cooper
Petroleum Company (Cooper Petroleum). Fagan was the owner" and
president of Cooper Petroleum and Clark, his son-in-law, was vice-president of both Cooper Petroleum and IMI. LaGloria Oil was persuaded by
Fagan and Clark to make credit sales of oil and gas to IMI, a company
with which Cooper Petroleum did a substantial amount of business. To
insure that the credit sales would be made by LaGloria Oil to IMI, Cooper
' Trawalter v. Shaefer, 142 Tex. 521, 179 S.W.2d 765 (1944); Corpus Christi v. Southern Community Gas Co., 368 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963).
8
Felton v. Johnson, 112 Tex. 412, 247 S.W. 837 (1923).
' Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 397 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. 1966); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. Mahaffey, 105 Tex. 394, 150 S.W. 881 (1912).
5
" TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3995 (1966). These provisions are now contained in TEx.
Bus. & COMM. CODE S 26.01 (1968).
" 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1969).
"2The "main purpose" exception is a judicial doctrine which allows certain promises to be enforced despite their failure to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. See text accompanying
note 17 infra.
s Even though Fagan did not own all of the stock in Cooper Petroleum Co., the remaining
stock was owned by his immediate family.
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Petroleum guaranteed in writing payment of all accounts arising from
such sales. As sales to IMI increased, LaGloria insisted upon further security before new sales contracts were negotiated. Clark orally promised LaGloria Oil that any further sales to IMI would be guaranteed personally
by Fagan. In reliance on this promise LaGloria Oil continued to make
credit sales to IMI. Although Fagan probably knew of Clark's promise,
he did not sign a written guaranty sent to him by LaGloria Oil, nor did
he tell LaGloria Oil that he had no intention of making the guaranty.
Clark, however, continued to promise LaGloria that Fagan would guaranty the accounts. In the meantime, Clark and Fagan successfully arranged
to have IMI's oil and gas purchase contracts transferred to Cooper Petroleum. Subsequently, Fagan individually purchased all of IMI's assets."'
About one month later, IMI was adjudged bankrupt. When LaGloria Oil
was unable to collect on the accounts of IMI in the bankruptcy proceeding, it attempted to hold Fagan and Cooper Petroleum liable on their
guaranties.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of
LaGloria Oil against both Fagan and Cooper Petroleum." Although the
supreme court reversed the decision because of the failure of LaGloria to
prove the indebtedness of IMI, the court remanded the case to be decided
in favor of LaGloria if the indebtedness were properly shown." Because
Cooper Petroleum's guaranty was in writing, no problem was presented by
the attempt to hold it liable as a guarantor. More significant, however,
was the supreme court's decision that Fagan could be held liable as a
guarantor even though the promise of guaranty was oral, and not made
by Fagan himself. Because of the business and family relationship existing
between Clark and Fagan, the court found that Fagan could be expected
to know of Clark's promise, and of LaGloria's reliance on it. Accordingly,
the court determined that Fagan was estopped to deny that Clark had the
authority to make such a promise. However, LaGloria Oil did not contend that Clark had actual authority, and the jury did not find that
Clark had apparent authority. The supreme court's determination was
based solely on Fagan's conduct in failing to repudiate his son-in-law's
unauthorized statement.
Although he was estopped to deny Clark's authority to promise his
guaranty, Fagan contended that the Statute of Frauds makes unenforceable the oral promise to guaranty the debt of another. LaGloria, however,
contended that the oral promise was enforceable either under the "main
purpose" exception to the Statute of Frauds, or because of LaGloria's reliance on Clark's promise. The court acknowledged the existence in Texas
of the main purpose exception," but found it to be inapplicable in the
instant situation. That exception applies when a person has made an oral
14

The only assets of any value which IMI owned were office furniture and the stock in a

wholly owned subsidiary, Texas Transport, Inc. Fagan purchased all of the stock in this subsidiary
corporation.

15423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ; App.-Houstor 1967).
" Records offered by La Gloria Oil to evidence the debt were found improperly admitted becauseT of a failure to satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
The court cited Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus, 163 Tex. 260, 354 S.W.2d 378 (1962).
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promise of guaranty, otherwise unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,

with the main purpose of obtaining a benefit accruing to him personally
as part of the consideration." Despite the close ties between Fagan and
IMI, and the personal interest which Fagan had in insuring the credit of

IMI, the court determined that the benefits which may have accrued to
Fagan formed no part of the consideration given by LaGloria. However,
the court did hold that Fagan was estopped to deny the enforceability of
the oral promise to the extent that it was relied upon by LaGloria Oil.

The decision in Cooper is undoubtedly correct, although the result may
initially appear to be a significant extension of principles mitigating the
effects of the Statute of Frauds. First, it is difficult to disagree with the
court's application of the main purpose exception to the Statute of
Frauds. The court properly recognized that the test should not be one of
mere benefit to the promisor, but rather should be one of benefit received
as part of the consideration. Second, the court properly found that Fagan
was estopped to assert that the oral promise was unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has adopted
this theory."' Perhaps the most significant aspect of the decision is the
court's determination that Fagan was estopped to deny the authority of
Clark. Although this determination is well supported by Texas decisions,"
the theory is sometimes misunderstood. As the court indicated, estoppel
in this instance does not depend on the existence of actual or apparent
authority. Therefore, the close relationship between Fagan and Clark was
important not because LaGloria could rely on Clark's authority, but because it indicated a high probability that Fagan knew of the promise and
subsequent reliance upon it by LaGloria. Seemingly, an estoppel could arise
where the person making the promise was not closely related to the purported guarantor if other evidence showed that the purported guarantor
knew of the promise and that it was being relied upon. However, in most
cases, as in Cooper, estoppel has been found applicable where the person
making the promise and the purported guarantor are closely related. 1
In contrast to Cooper is the decision in Owen v. Hendricks," where the
court made more stringent the test for compliance with the Statute of
Frauds in another area of the law. In that case, Owen wrote to Hendricks, asking whether Owen could sell "your 960 acres in Dallam
County" and asking for an answer by return letter. Hendricks answered,
saying in part, "The 960 acres in Dallam County is [sic] for sale. The
price is $225.00 per acre net to me." Owen later sold the land but Hendricks refused to pay him his commission.
The Real Estate Dealers License Act provides that no action shall be
"2

A. COaRBN, CONTRACTS S 366 (1950).

OF CONTRACTS S 217A (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968).
(SECOND)
A.R. Clark Inv. Co. v. Green, 375 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1964); Johnson v. Sovereign Camp,
W.O.W., 125 Tex. 329, 83 S.W.2d 605 (1935); Burnett v. Atteberry, 105 Tex. 119, 145 S.W. 582
(1912).
"A.R. Clark Inv. Co. v. Green, 375 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1964) (husband-wife relationship);
Johnson v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 125 Tex. 329, 83 S.W.2d 605 (1935) (husband-wife relationship); Burnett v. Atteberry, 105 Tex. 119, 145 S.W. 582 (1912) (principal-agent relationship).
22433 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1968).
29 RESTATEMENT
21See
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brought for the recovery of a real estate commission unless a written

agreement upon which the action is brought is signed by the person to be
charged with the commission.23 To satisfy the requirements of the statute,
the written agreement must provide a description of the property which
satisfies the Statute of Frauds with respect to specificity. Such a description

may also be contained in another existing writing to which the signed
writing refers. 4 Although the description of the property in the writing
signed by Hendricks was not sufficient, the writing signed by Owen suf-

ficiently described the property.
The court of civil appeals affirmed a decision in favor of Owen." On
writ to the supreme court, Owen maintained that the letter which he had
signed could be incorporated by reference into that signed by Hendricks.

He relied upon the fact that both letters related to the same transaction
and one was in response to the other. However, the court held that one
letter must expressly refer to the other before the doctrine of incorporation may be invoked.26 This case makes it clear that a real estate dealer
entering an informal agreement to sell land should be certain that a suf-

ficient description of the land is signed by the landowner, or in the alternative, that a writing signed by the landowner expressly refers to another writing which sufficiently describes the land.
However, in Clements v. Withers,7 a tort case involving the Real Estate Dealers License Act" and the Statute of Frauds, the court allowed a
real estate dealer to recover his commission where the writing signed by
the landowner neither described the land sufficiently, nor referred to another writing which did so. In Clements an exclusive listing agreement
was made between Hall, the landowner, and Withers, the real estate
broker. The agreement described the land as "situated in the County of
Henderson, State of Texas: approximately 475 acres, more or less, adjoining Koon Kreek Klub." Had the agreement read "my 475 acres,"
the description would have been sufficient. 9
Defendants Clements and Perryman, purchasers of the land, agreed
with Hall in the written agreement to "take care" of Withers. However,
they did not pay Withers his commission. Withers subsequently sued
Clements and Perryman to recover damages for the tort, i.e., inducement
of breach of contract. They contended that the commission could not be
collected because the written listing agreement between Hall and Withers
would not support a claim for the commission by Withers against Hall
under the Real Estate Dealers License Act and the Statute of Frauds.
Judgment in favor of Withers was entered by the trial court and the
court of civil appeals. The supreme court, presented with the issue for the
2
3TEx.

24

Id.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a,

§ 28

(1969).

'Owen v. Hendricks, 426 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968).
" See 4 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 582 n.4 (3d ed. 1961).
27437 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1969).
2
STEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (1969).

In Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d 222 (1949), it was held that a signed writing
which referred to "my land" or "land owned by me" was sufficient if extrinsic evidence could be
used to show that the signer of the memorandum owned only one tract of land which could fit
the description in the memorandum.
2
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first time, affirmed the judgment in favor of Withers. It found that the
Statute of Frauds is intended to "prevent fraud by those who would misrepresent verbal promises," but does not "give third parties the right to
interfere with the performance of oral contracts."" Thus, even though a
broker may not be able to recover his commission from a landowner because of a deficiency in the written description of the land, he may be
able to recover in tort from one who induces the landowner not to pay
the commission. Although it is not clear whether the Clements decision
can apply to contracts unenforceable for reasons other than the Statute of
Frauds, the decision in many instances should discourage collusion between
purchasers and sellers, or unilateral action by purchasers to avoid payment
of brokers' commissions.
III. DAMAGES
Only one case was decided by the Texas courts during the survey period
which dealt with a significant contract damages question. P. G. Lake, Inc.
v. Sheffield" involved the question of whether the proper measure of damages for a mining lessee's breach of an agreement to repair and restore land
is (1) the diminution in market value resulting from the non-performance, or (2) the cost of such repair. In Lake the defendant, assignee of an
oil and gas lease, entered plaintiff's land for the purpose of drilling a well.
Prior to entry it was agreed that if the well was dry, defendant would repair certain damage done to the land in connection with the drilling. After
the well was found to be dry, defendant left the land without making the
repairs in question. Thereafter, plaintiff successfully sued to recover the
reasonable cost of repairs. On appeal, defendant contended that the measure of damages properly should have been the diminution in market value
of the land, although evidence of this amount was not introduced by
either party in the trial court.
Although the court of civil appeals found no Texas cases dealing with
precisely the same situation, it approved a rule announced by the Oklahoma supreme court in a case with similar facts. " In that case the Oklahoma court declared:
[T]he measure of damages in an action by lessor against lessee for damages
for breach of contract is ordinarily the reasonable cost of performance of
the work; however, where the contract provision breached was merely incidental to the main purpose in view, and where the economic benefit which
would result to the lessor by full performance of the work is grossly disproportionate to the cost of performance, the damages which lessor may recover are limited to the diminution in value resulting to the premises because of the nonperformance.'
Accordingly, the court of civil appeals agreed that the proper measure of
damages should have been the diminution in market value. However, it
30437 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. 1968).
31438 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
SPeevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 906 (1963).
" 438 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969), citing Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal &
Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 37$ U.S. 906 (1963).
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declined to reverse the decision, finding that the defendant had the burden in the trial court to plead and prove facts showing that damages
equal to the cost of repair would exceed the pecuniary injury sustained by
the plaintiff. The court seemed to find apposite certain Texas cases dealing with breach of building and construction contracts.' It observed that
if defects in construction cannot be remedied without an expenditure disproportionate to the end to be attained, which might constitute economic
waste, the proper measure of damages is the diminution in value of the
building.
A serious question is raised by the decision in this case. First, it seems
clear that no issue of economic waste is involved. Lake is easily distinguished from a breach of construction contract situation where a builder
might be required to tear down an entire house in order to remedy a minor
defect. In a situation such as that in Lake, the landowner should be entitled to the performance promised by the lessee. Often, the diminution
in the actual value of the land is negligible. However, the speculative
value of the land or the value of the land to the owner may have been
greatly diminished by the nonperformance and the landowner's right to
insure such value is largely taken away by this manner of calculating
damages. Finally, it seems persuasive that the lessee knew the potential cost
of repair at the time of entering into the agreement. To disallow damages equal to the cost of repair may allow the lessee to breach a repair
agreement with impunity whenever the cost of repair seems to exceed the
diminution in value of the land.
IV.

PAROL EVIDENCE

One case decided during the survey period seems to add confusion to
the parol evidence rule. In Pargas of Canton, Inc. v. Clowere plaintiff, a
large out-of-state corporation, purchased the stock of a Texas butane gas
company through an intermediary. The stock was purchased from defendant and the other owners of the gas company. In connection with this
transaction plaintiff orally agreed to continue defendant in its employ for
as long as his work was satisfactory. A written purchase agreement signed
by defendant contained a covenant not to compete which prohibited defendant from engaging in the gas business within fifty miles of the purchased company for a period of five years. Having terminated defendant's employment one and one-half years after the purchase, plaintiff
brought suit in district court to restrain defendant from entering into

competition in violation of the covenant not to compete. The jury found
that plaintiff breached its oral agreement with defendant in terminating
his employment and could not enforce the covenant not to compete. On
appeal, plaintiff contended that it was error for the district court to have
admitted evidence of the oral agreement. However, the court of civil appeals, affirming, determined that the evidence was proper for the purpose
34 Hutson v. Chambless, 157 Tex. 193, 300 S.W.2d 943 (1957); Totton v. Houghton, 2 S.W.2d
530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1927).
'3434 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968).
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of showing additional consideration for the written contract which would
not contradict any of the written recitals of consideration and held accordingly that because of the purchaser's failure to honor the agreement
of employment it could not, in a court of equity, enforce the covenant
not to compete.
Despite the court's quick dismissal of the purchaser's contention, it
seems clear that other questions are fairly raised by the case. Although
the general rule in Texas allows parol evidence to be admitted for the
purpose of showing the real consideration for a written agreement,' the
rule is not without exceptions. Where the consideration recited is either
promissory or contractual in nature, admissibility of parol evidence is often
restricted. Part of the consideration recited in the written covenant not
to compete, the cancellation of certain notes executed by defendant and
other stockholders, would seem to be contractual. It is generally accepted
that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict contractual consideration, especially if the result would be to change or defeat the legal
operation and effect of the instrument." Although the court properly decided that the oral agreement, as additional consideration, would not contradict the recited consideration, it is not so clear that the additional consideration failed to change the effect of the entire written instrument. Indeed, if the parol evidence rule is to have any effect, it would seem that
the most important factor is the effect which admission of parol evidence
has on the entire agreement rather than merely on the recited consideration.
Two other theories have been suggested for admission of evidence such
as that involved in the instant case. The first is that proof of additional
consideration in the form of promises may be admitted because the contract does not disclose an intent to embody the entire transaction." The
second is that parol evidence of a "collateral agreement" may be admitted
provisionally to show that the writing embodied only a part of the parties'
agreement." Either theory would seem to be more acceptable than a general rule that additional consideration may always be shown if it does not
contradict written recitals of consideration. Because the parol evidence
rule exists principally to protect the sanctity of written instruments
against later introduction of less reliable extrinsic evidence, and because
the rule presumes that the parties' intentions are wholly embodied in the
writing, the admission of parol evidence in cases such as Pargas should
rest upon a showing that the writing does not fully embody the parties'
agreement. Although the court's admission of the parol evidence may have
been proper, its summary answer to the question of admissibility is of
doubtful precedential value in an already confused area of law.
Another rather subtle question presented by Pargas was not discussed
6

" Rubin v. Adams, 368 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963), error ref. n.r.e.
87 Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 (1955); Trantham v. Roper, 308
S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957), error ref. n.r.e.; D. Sullivan & Co. v. Schreiner,
222 S.W. 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1920), error ref. nr.e.
582 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW oF EVIDENCE § 1613, at 460 (2d ed. 1956).

391d. S 1631.
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by the court. In Pargas the gas company of which defendant was a stockholder was sought to be acquired by Pargas of Maryland, a foreign corporation. The purchase was accomplished through another Texas corporation, Butane Supplies, Inc. Pargas of Maryland arranged for Butane Supplies to purchase the stock of defendant's company, and subsequently for
Butane Supplies and defendant's company together to be transferred to
Pargas of Maryland. The written purchase agreement which included the
covenant not to compete was signed by two representatives of Butane
Supplies, defendant, and the other stockholders of defendant's company.
Although one of the representatives of Butane Supplies had been authorized by Pargas of Maryland to negotiate for the purchase of defendant's
company, no officer of Pargas of Maryland actually signed the purchase
agreement containing the covenant not to compete. The statement has
been made that the parol evidence rule applies only as to parties to an instrument.'0 Although many of the cases which support this statement involve admission of parol evidence offered by, rather than against, "strangers" to a written contract, at least one Texas case indicates an application
of this theory where evidence is offered against one not a party to an instrument." In that case the defendant, a real estate broker acting as agent
for a landowner, negotiated a contract for the purchase and sale of the
land with the plaintiffs. It was alleged that the defendant orally agreed
with the plaintiffs to procure a loan in aid of the purchase. In a suit by
the plaintiffs to recover damages resulting from the defendants failure to
procure the loan, the court permitted the plaintiffs to introduce evidence
of the parol agreement. The court reasoned that the parol contract could
be shown as being a collateral agreement "independent of and not inconsistent with the written agreement." It has been suggested that the rationale underlying this decision is that the defendant, in promising to
procure the loan, was acting in his individual rather than representative
capacity, and accordingly, was not a party to the contract." There seems
to be no reason why this rationale could not also control the decision in
Pargas. Although the evidence in Pargas showed that the parol employment agreement was communicated to the defendant by a representative
of Butane Supplies who was also a signatory to the written agreement, the
situation suggests that the defendant may not have considered the oral
agreement to have been a proper subject for the written agreement. Just
as the purchase agreement and covenant not to compete logically composed a contract between the defendant and Butane Supplies, so the oral
agreement of employment was logically an agreement between defendant
and Pargas of Maryland. Accordingly, whether the collateral nature of
the oral agreement is shown by the fact that the agreement was one between the defendant and a "stranger" to the instrument, or whether the
agreement having been made with a "stranger" tends to show that the
agreement was collateral, the parol evidence would be admissible.
40 See note 38 supra.
41 Evers v. Arnold, 210 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1948).
42

Id. at 271.
'2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY,

TEXAS LAW OF EVroENCE

S 1621, at 479 n.76 (2d ed. 1956).
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V.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Arbitration Under Insurance Contract. In Carpenterv. North River Insurance Co." the Houston court of civil appeals was presented with the
problem of whether the Texas General Arbitration Act" precludes common law arbitration of a dispute arising under an insurance contract. Before amendment of the Act in 1965," article 238 expressly provided that
"[N]othing herein shall be construed as affecting the existing right of
parties to arbitrate their differences in such mode as they select.""7 Accordingly, common law arbitration was held to be valid." However, that
provision was not re-enacted in 1965, nor did any of the 1965 amendments similarly provide that statutory arbitration was not exclusive.
Also, the new amendments expressly excluded from the Act contracts of
insurance and disputes arising thereunder."' Because of these two factors
a question existed whether disputes arising under insurance contracts could
validly be submitted to arbitration-specifically, to common law arbitration.
Carpenterinvolved an insurance policy containing an uninsured motorist clause. The insured, Carpenter, was involved in a collision with a driver
who had no public liability insurance. Subsequently, Carpenter made a
claim under the uninsured motorist clause of the policy. Because Carpenter and the insurer were unable to agree on either the liability or the
amount of damages, arbitration of the claim was agreed to as provided in
an arbitration clause of the policy. The arbitration hearing resulted in an
award of damages to Carpenter, but the insurer refused to pay. The trial
court dismissed a suit by Carpenter to reduce the award to judgment, holding that common law arbitration is no longer valid in Texas under the
Texas General Arbitration Act. The court of civil appeals reversed, basing
it decision on several grounds. First, the court found that common law arbitration was recognized in Texas even before the enactment of an arbitration statute.30 It reasoned that because repealed article 238 referred to
"the existing right of parties to arbitrate," the legislature considered parties to have that right at the time of enactment of the statute. Second, the
court found article 1 " to be significant, providing that the common law,
so far as not inconsistent with Texas law, shall continue in force until
altered or repealed by the legislature. Thus the court determined that in
the absence of statutory language rendering common law arbitration invalid, it does not necessarily follow that failure to re-enact article 238 removes this right. Finally, the court observed that in other states providing
for statutory arbitration, and in Texas under the labor arbitration sta44436 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
"TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-38 (1959).
46Id. art. 238.
47 Id.
'Ferguson
v. Ferguson, 93 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1936); Bell v. Campbell,
143 S.W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1911); Hill v. Walker, 140 S.W. 1159 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1911).
4' TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (Supp. 1969).
"0Rector v. Hunter, 15 Tex. 380

(1855).

s TEx. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 1 (Supp. 1969).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

tute," common law arbitration remains available. Although the decision
seems correct, it may be contrary to the intention of the legislature in
excluding insurance disputes from arbitration. There is evidence that the
legislature excluded insurance contract arbitration from the Act in an
attempt to avoid problems created by the use of form contracts in insurance sales." Such contracts containing arbitration clauses force an insured
to accept an agreement to arbitrate along with the policy of insurance. Because an arbitration clause may be written to favor the insurer, the problem is one which merits consideration. It has been suggested that state officials have the requisite authority to prevent the use of such clauses when
they unfairly favor the insurer.' 4 By this view, the exemption of all insurance arbitration seems unnecessary. Under Carpenter the many salutary
uses of arbitration remain available. However, it may now become necessary to carve out new rules and methods of preventing abuse of arbitration
in the insurance industry.
Contracts With Public School Districts. In National Surety Corp. v.
Friendswood Independent School District5 the supreme court held that
where a school district had eligible funds available at the time of entering
into a contract for construction, subsequent exhaustion of those funds
does not affect the right of the contractor to obtain an enforceable judgment against the district for sums payable under the contract. By statute,"
the trustees of a public school district are prohibited to enter into contracts
which create a "deficiency debt" against the district.' This statute was
interpreted by the supreme court in 1955 to preclude the payment of
otherwise valid contractual claims unless funds for the current year of the
claim were available." Accordingly, even though a school district had
sufficient funds available in the year when it entered into a contract, no
liability was created if the funds had been expended at the time when a
claim was presented. In Friendswood the court expressly overruled this
decision. Although the court acknowledged that sufficient funds must have
been available at the time of the making of the contract, it held that a
valid claim or judgment may be enforced against the school district at a
later time, and paid out of surplus funds of other years."
Oral Modification of Financing Contract. One case decided by the
court of civil appeals provides an interesting discussion of the effect which
2

1d. arts. 239-49 (1959).

"Note,

Arbitration and Award--Commercial Law-An Agreement To Submit an Existing or

Future Dispute to Arbitration Is Valid and Enforceable, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 372 (1965).
54Carrington, The 1965 General Arbitration Statute of Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 21, 38-39 (1966).
55 433 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968).
6
' Tux. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2749 (1965).
Although art. 2749 prohibits creating a deficiency debt only in regard to contracts with
teachers, this has been extended to apply to other types of contracts as well. Campbell v. Jones,
153 Tex. 101, 264 S.W.2d 425 (1954); Stephenson v. Union Seating Co., 26 Tex. Civ. App. 16,
62 S.W. 128 (1901), error denied.
5
" Aldine Ind. School Dist. v. Standley, 154 Tex. 547, 280 S.W.2d 578 (1955).
"8 To enforce a claim against surplus funds of a prior or subsequent year, the court held that
mandamus was the proper remedy. National Sur. Corp. v. Friendswood Ind. School Dist., 433
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968).

1970]

CONTRACTS

an oral agreement to accept late payments may have on a creditor's rights
under a written note and security instrument. In Southwestern Investment
Co. v. Alvarez"° the defendant company financed the purchase of an automobile by the plaintiff. Under provisions in a promissory note and chattel
mortgage, defendant was given the power to repossess and sell the automobile upon plaintiff's default in making payments. When plaintiff became
delinquent in his payments, he contacted a collection agent of defendant,
who orally agreed that if the car was delivered to defendant, and late payments tendered with a "late charge," the car would be returned to plaintiff. However, after delivering the car and tendering the late payments
and "late charges," plaintiff found that the car had been sold. The court
of civil appeals affirmed a decision by the trial court, awarding plaintiff
damages for conversion of the automobile. Although the decision is undoubtedly correct, the reasoning of the court is not entirely clear. Plaintiff alleged that because defendant had often entered into similar late payment arrangements with him and other persons on prior occasions, defendant should be estopped to assert an inconsistent course of action. The
court agreed, finding that "equitable estoppel" applied. However, the court
further found that the oral agreement was amply supported by consideration because plaintiff obligated himself to pay a "late charge" in consideration for defendant's promise to forbear. In finding the existence of consideration, the court seemed to distinguish Phoenix Furniture Co. v. McCracken,:1 an earlier case involving a promise of forbearance by a creditor.
In that case the creditor agreed not to exercise any of its rights under a
note and chattel mortgage while the delinquent debtor was out of town
and before an itemized statement of the debtor's account was made available. There the court determined that because no consideration supported
the promise, the creditor was not liable for repossession of the property
under the mortgage. However, it is doubtful that the only distinction between the two situations is the existence of consideration in the instant
case. If equitable estoppel properly applies to the facts in Alvarez, the
earlier case may be distinguished by its facts. First, there was no showing
of prior acts of forbearance by the creditor in Phoenix which would have
induced the debtor to rely on the creditor's promise. Second, although in
Phoenix the debtor left town after the creditor agreed to forbear, her doing so is arguably not the type of reliance contemplated by the doctrine
of equitable estoppel.
Perhaps it is unfortunate that the court chose to discuss equitable estoppel. The sufficiency of finding that the agreement to forbear was supported by consideration seems clear. The court ultimately based its decision
on the enforceability of the oral promise as a contract. It found simply
that the defendant was estopped to deny that its obligations were affected
by that contract. Accordingly, the doctrines of equitable estoppel and
oral modification of a written contract become confused. The court found
that defendant's collection agent had apparent authority to make the
60 442 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1969).
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1928).
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promise of forbearance. Such authority is a necessary element
the existence of an enforceable agreement. However, the court
on the finding that defendant's manager knew or should have
the promise, but failed to repudiate it. This determination is
only with respect to estoppel."5
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See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
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